The Rise and Fall of the Breadwinner Citizen, as Reflecteed in dutch and EU Migration Law by Walsum, S.K. van
 
 
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE BREADWINNER CITIZEN, AS REFLECTED 
IN DUTCH AND EU MIGRATION LAW 
 
Sarah van Walsum*  
 
Introduction  
 
Family migration is a hot issue in many of the EU member states. More and 
more member states are introducing income requirements to ensure that 
family migrants will not have to rely on public funds, language and ‘civil 
knowledge’ tests to ensure their successful integration, and minimum age limits 
to help prevent forced marriages. At the same time, family migration is, to a 
growing degree, being regulated through EU law. In particular, EU citizens who 
have made use of their right to freedom of movement within the EU can appeal 
to EU directive 2004/38 (the Citizenship Directive). Largely stemming from the 
case law of the EU Court of Justice (ECJ), these mobile EU citizens have acquired 
extensive rights to family reunification that countervail the restrictive 
measures, described above, that are being introduced by various member 
states, the Netherlands among them.  
 
In my book The Family and the Nation,1 I defend the thesis that family 
migration policies reflect certain assumptions regarding family norms and 
regarding the relationship between family and state. These assumptions are 
moreover relevant for notions of substantive citizenship. In this article, I will 
compare how linked assumptions concerning family and citizenship have 
informed Dutch family migration policies in the past to how these linked 
assumptions inform migration policies in the present. I will then review the case 
law of the ECJ to see to what extent it does or does not reflect the same 
underlying assumptions concerning family relations. Finally, I shall reflect on 
what this case law may tell us about the ECJ’s perspective on substantive EU 
citizenship.  
 
I. A Brief Biography of the Breadwinner Citizen as Chief Addressee of the 
Dutch Welfare State 
 
In the first chapter of The Family and the Nation, I discuss the changes that 
have occurred, in the Netherlands, in dominant family norms, and what these 
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changes have meant for the notion of the citizen as an active and responsible 
member of the national community. 
 
I trace how, in the period of reconstruction that immediately followed the 
Second World War, the Dutch established a modern welfare state that took the 
nuclear family as its basic unit. The male breadwinner and head of the family 
was the chief addressee of the welfare state as an economic project of 
redistribution. He received the family wage and benefits under  public housing, 
health insurance, and social insurance schemes. Ultimately, welfare benefits 
were all meant to ensure that he could fulfil his financial obligations as a 
breadwinner.2 
 
At the same time, his wife formed the subject of a moral project of modernity. 
Initially through religious institutions but increasingly through secular and 
professional social services, it was through wives and mothers that Dutch 
society was groomed for the post-war industrialized consumer society.3 Even 
though the work women performed in the home was not validated in economic 
terms, it was validated in moral terms. Although subordinate to and dependent 
on her husband, the male breadwinner, the wife and mother was, nonetheless, 
relevant for the notion of citizenship that he stood for. Without a family to 
support, a wife to tame and support him, and to act as a mother who could 
pass on the virtues of citizenship to his children, he was no true and proper 
citizen. As long as he remained emblematic of substantive citizenship, 
preserving the unity of the male breadwinner’s family remained a key principle 
of Dutch nationality and migration law. His family unit was included in the 
Dutch nation; those of his foreign counterparts were excluded and attributed to 
their own nations. Foreign women who married Dutch men automatically 
acquired the Dutch nationality. Dutch women who married foreign men 
automatically lost it.4 
 
All this changed in the 1960s and 70s. The Netherlands had signed international 
treaties guaranteeing equal rights for men and women. As of 1965, Dutch 
women acquired the right to maintain their nationality after marriage, and 
foreign women no longer automatically became Dutch after marrying a 
Dutchman – although for them it would remain far simpler to acquire Dutch 
nationality than for Dutch women’s foreign husbands. It would take until 1985 
before men and women would be treated on completely equal terms in Dutch 
nationality law.5 
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In the course of the 1970s, the women’s movement started to take hold in the 
Netherlands. The sexual revolution took off. Legal reforms and the introduction 
of welfare benefits made divorce a real option. Marriage as an institution was 
being put to the test. Initially, this moral ferment did not lead to significant 
changes in Dutch family law, for the simple reason that there was no consensus 
as to what the family was or should be.6 After much debate and legal 
procedures that went as far as the European Court of Human Rights, a new 
consensus was reached in the end. Since the early 1990s, Dutch family law has 
been reformed on a number of fronts. Unmarried couples can secure their 
mutual rights and obligations as extensively as married ones can. Homosexuals 
enjoy nearly all the same rights as heterosexual partners. The relationship 
between parents and children has been rephrased in terms that allow for 
various forms of parenting in various combinations and various degrees of 
intensity. Family life is no longer shaped by a religiously determined morality, 
but has been made subject to individual tastes and inclinations – no longer 
prescribed but a matter of choice.7 
 
All individuals are now assumed to support themselves and paid labour, rather 
than family relations, has become the major, and by now it would seem the 
only, vector to social participation and substantive citizenship.8 Providing 
unpaid care is no longer seen as the essence of (subordinate) female citizenship 
and social security provisions no longer compensate for women’s unpaid 
commitment to care. Neither, however, has care been reformulated as a 
collective responsibility of the state. A comparative study of social policies in 
ten different Western European states shows that the Netherlands provides 
working parents relatively little support in the way of subsidized child care or 
parental leave.9 The new model citizen is expected to be readily available for 
the labour market, unhampered by burdens of care. 
 
As the public/private divide between the genders is becoming less marked, a 
new hierarchy seems to be emerging in the labour market. Significantly, since 
the mid1990s, there has been a steady increase in the number of persons hired 
on a part-time basis, of independently employed persons, of persons working 
on temporary contracts, and of persons hired through employment agencies. 
The combined statistics of the Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen 
(UWV, the organization that administers all of the formal social security 
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schemes in the Netherlands) and of Statistics Netherlands, indicate that more 
than 13 percent of the current working population in the Netherlands are self-
employed, while more than 25 percent of those in salaried employment are 
hired on a temporary basis. The figures also show that these two categories 
have grown in importance over the past ten years, and that they run the 
highest risk of becoming unemployed in periods of recession.10 
 
In the sector of home-based care, which accounts for more than 200,000 
workers,11 employees with full benefits have, since the sector was reorganised 
in 2007, been largely replaced by quasi-self-employed workers.12 The exclusion 
of home care workers and workers in household services from employee 
benefits has a long tradition in the Netherlands, and has in the past been 
justified with the argument that this sector employs almost exclusively women 
who, being able to depend on a breadwinner, have no need for unemployment 
insurance and other such benefits.  
 
Nowadays their exclusion from employee benefits is justified by redefining 
them as entrepreneurial providers of personal services, who are capable of 
managing their own risks. At the same time, the norm of the full-time, 
permanently employed and fully insured breadwinner is being abandoned by 
other sectors as well, and not only those dominated by female employment. In 
the postal sector that – formerly at least – hired many men, full-time workers 
on permanent contract are now being replaced by part-timers and/or people 
hired as quasi independents.13 Recruitment folders of TNT, one of the major 
mail delivery services in the Netherlands, promote the mail delivery cart as the 
‘logical sequel to the baby-buggy.’ What these developments imply is that the 
family wage and the associated benefits of unemployment insurance, old age 
pensions, etc. are no longer as self-evident as they once were. While providing 
full-time home-based care is no longer acknowledged as the legitimate 
occupation for female citizens, the former male ideal of the breadwinner citizen 
threatens to become an elusive goal as well.  
 
II. The Breadwinner Citizen in Dutch Migration Law: an Increasingly 
Ambiguous Figure 
 
In the same period that family norms were being hotly contested in the 
Netherlands in the 1970s and 80s, the position of migrants within Dutch society 
was becoming a political issue, that is: their cultural and religious rights, their 
right to settle and be joined by their families, their right to legal inclusion 
through a secure residence status and easy access to naturalization. These 
discussions were carried out in a context of accelerated decolonization and 
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anti-racist activism. According to the dominant discourse of the time, the 
Netherlands was a multicultural society, in which no cultural tradition was 
promoted as superior to any other.14 As long as Dutch male citizens still held a 
strong claim to the protection of their family rights, limiting male migrants’ 
rights to family reunification was problematic. And as long as cultural rights 
were protected, family ties associated with those rights enjoyed protection as 
well. 
 
By the early 1990s the multicultural honeymoon was over. In the same period 
that a new consensus was finally being reached in the Netherlands on the rules 
of family law, a new interest also emerged in the notion of citizenship as an 
expression of national identity and cohesion. Having and maintaining cultural 
rights as an ethnic minority was no longer seen as a right, but as a hindrance to 
effective participation in the dominant society.15 This implied a policy of 
assimilation, but in order for minorities to be assimilated, there had to be a 
normative framework for them to conform to. This normative framework was 
largely found in the norms that informed the emerging consensus on family 
law: equality between the sexes, sexual freedom, the individual right to choose 
and the individual responsibility that this implied. As in the contemporaneous 
discourse on social security, in the emerging discourse on integration too, civic 
participation came to be primarily defined in terms of paid labour.16 Issues of 
faith and minority culture were relegated to the private sphere.17 
 
The liberal and secular terms that came to inform Dutch family law produced a 
new touchstone of Dutch identity that made it possible to construct migrant 
identity as its antithesis, defined in terms that are patriarchal, sexist, religiously 
bound and gendered. He is lacking in the individualist spirit and self-sufficiency 
required by our modern, competitive and market-driven society; she is passive, 
poorly educated and submissive, incapable of raising her children to join the 
new breed of citizens. He forms a threat to her emancipation, so she should be 
excluded in her own interests. She forms a threat to the nation’s future, so her 
exclusion can be justified in the interest of the nation.  
 
This message is very explicitly conveyed by proposals that the former Dutch 
cabinet sent to Dutch parliament last autumn for further restrictions on family 
migration.18 Those men who are depicted as deliberately choosing to marry a 
foreign bride because they expect she will be less emancipated, more 
compliant, subservient and ‘willing to provide sexual services’ than a woman 
raised in the Netherlands, are accused of displaying an attitude that “does not 
coincide with the Dutch premise of equality within marriage.”19 The 
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recommended restrictive measures are repressive in nature, aiming to tighten 
control and widen the scope for criminal sanctions. 
Looking back on the past 25 years, it is striking to note that the category of 
migrants that was automatically included in the Dutch nation up until 1985 is 
now being presented as the most problematic candidate for inclusion: the 
foreign bride of a Dutch national.  
 
Yet while they promote the new individualistic and egalitarian family norms as 
being ‘typically Dutch’, these same proposals also suggest aspiring family 
migrants should comply with the norm of the breadwinner citizen and his 
dependent spouse. The spouse in the Netherlands should be required to have a 
steady job, earning more than minimum wage, and to have a certain level of 
education, so as to be able to provide the foreign spouse with a ‘stable future’, 
while the foreign spouse’s right to stay is kept dependent on the ongoing 
stability of the relationship. The current cabinet even proposes to extend this 
period of dependency from three to five years.20  
 
Thus, the breadwinner citizen plays an ambiguous role in current Dutch 
discourse on migration law. While being confirmed as a model of civic 
responsibility, he at the same time serves to mark and exclude the undesirable 
migrant as everything that the modern day Dutch citizen is not. Those who 
aspire to the ideal of a full-time steady breadwinner, but cannot reach it, can 
find comfort in the message that the welfare state has been and is being 
purged of the evils of patriarchy, while the breadwinner citizen nonetheless 
remains its darling and chief addressee, deserving of the privileges and security 
that this implies. 
 
III. Family and Citizenship in EU Migration Law 
 
A serious obstacle to achieving the kind of reforms proposed by the former 
(and current) Dutch cabinets is the current state of EU migration law. Dutch 
citizens who wish to circumvent Dutch restrictions on family migration can do 
so by moving to another EU member state. Once settled there, they can 
request the admission of their foreign family member on the grounds of EU 
law, which is considerably more liberal in this respect than Dutch law. Once the 
foreign family member has gained entry, the entire family can – in due course – 
return to the Netherlands, again on the basis of EU, not national, migration law. 
This tactic is sometimes referred to as the ‘U-turn’.21 
 
That EU laws on the freedom of movement within the EU should trump 
national rules regulating family migration to the EU is not an obvious matter. In 
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fact, this was and still is a contested issue.22 Following the judgement of the ECJ 
in the Akrich case, it initially looked like member states would maintain 
jurisdiction over family migration from third countries into the EU, and that EU 
law would only apply to third-country nationals who were already legally 
residing in one of the EU member states, but wished to accompany an EU-
citizen family member to another member state.23  
 
In 2004, the EU Directive 2004/38 (the Citizenship Directive) on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the member states was adopted. This formed a single 
codification of all previous legislation on the freedom of movement within the 
EU. The European legislator could have taken this opportunity to integrate the 
Akrich judgement into this directive, however it did not do so. Article 3 of the 
directive stipulates in paragraph 1 that the directive is to “apply to all Union 
citizens who move to or reside in a Member State other than that of which they 
are a national, and to their family members, as defined in point 2 of Article 2 of 
the directive, who accompany or join them.”24 
  
In the Metock judgement of 25 July 2008, the ECJ ruled that family members 
from third countries could claim residence rights on the basis of this directive, 
regardless of whether or not they had already been admitted to reside in one 
of the EU member states.25 This case concerned four  rejected asylum seekers, 
all originating from West Africa. All four of them were married to women who 
resided in Ireland, but held nationalities of other EU member states. Their 
wives’ claims to freedom of movement fell under the jurisdiction of EU law. The 
question was whether their claims included residence rights for a husband who 
had been refused admission to one of the EU member states. The Irish state, 
referring to the earlier decision in Akrich, decided that this could not be the 
case. In its judgement, the ECJ explicitly rejected its earlier position in Akrich 
and referred to the newly implemented Directive 2004/38, stating that “if 
Union citizens were not allowed to lead a normal family life in the host Member 
State, the exercise of the freedoms they are guaranteed by the Treaty would be 
seriously obstructed”26 and that “as recital 5 in the preamble to Directive 
2004/38 points out, the right of all Union citizens to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States should, if it is to be exercised under 
objective conditions of dignity, be also granted to their family members, 
irrespective of nationality.”27 
 
In effect, the decision in Metock amounted to an official acceptance of the 
legitimacy of the U-turn tactic described above. This implies a considerable 
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restraint on member states’ control over family migration by third country 
nationals. Admittedly, the member states may adopt the necessary measures 
to refuse, terminate or withdraw any right conferred by that directive in the 
case of abuse of rights or fraud, such as marriages of convenience. However 
until now, the ECJ has interpreted the freedom of member states to refuse 
admission on such grounds in a restrictive fashion. The single fact that the 
citizen of one EU member state has moved to another in order to be able to 
claim rights under EU law for his or her third country family members is not 
enough to establish abuse of rights.28 
  
Interestingly, the ECJ not only associates the right to ‘lead a normal family life’ 
with EU citizenship, it also links care provided within the family to the 
fundamental freedoms associated with EU citizenship. Thus, in the Carpenter 
case, the ECJ ruled that a British salesman would be hindered in his freedom to 
provide services throughout the EU, if his Filipino wife was unable to stay in his 
home in the UK and look after his children while he was on the road.29 In the 
Chen case, the ECJ ruled that an Irish infant would not be able to effectively 
enjoy her right to reside in the UK unless her Chinese mother, her care 
provider, was able to reside there with her.30 In the Baumbast case, the ECJ 
ruled that the child of an EU citizen who had made use of his or her freedom to 
work in another EU member state has an independent right to remain in that 
member state and  receive an education there, even if the EU-citizen parent 
has moved elsewhere. Again, the care-providing parent shares in this right, 
regardless of his or her nationality.31 This will even be the case if the care-
providing parent has no independent source of income and must appeal to the 
member state involved for welfare benefits. 32 
 
IV. Exit the Breadwinner Citizen? 
 
EU family migration law differs from that of the Netherlands on a number of 
essential points. First, the enjoyment of family life is inherent to the enjoyment 
of EU citizenship, i.e. an EU citizen must be able to enjoy the fundamental rights 
and freedoms inherent to EU citizenship without having to subject him or 
herself to interference in family life, unless there are pressing issues of public 
order or national security at stake. Whether or not the family conforms to 
specific cultural norms is immaterial.33 Second, care work provided in the 
context of family relations is a necessary prerequisite for the practical 
realisation of the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by EU law, i.e. 
this work has material value for the effective realisation of free movement 
within the EU economy, and for the reproduction of EU workers, that must be 
acknowledged and, if need be, paid for by the member states.34 Third, minors 
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have an independent right as EU citizens to the fundamental freedoms of 
movement, residence and use of services within the EU. On the one hand, 
member states may not make this right dependent on the continued residence 
of a parent with EU citizenship; on the other hand, member states must render 
this right effective by allowing for the residence of the care-providing parent, 
regardless of whether or not (s)he is an EU citizen. Moreover, general case law 
on the freedom of movement makes it clear that to be acknowledged as an 
economic actor and hence to be entitled to the fundamental freedom of 
movement for work or the provision of services, one need not qualify as a 
breadwinner – any work performed on a regular basis in exchange for money is 
sufficient to allow one to qualify.35 Finally, any EU citizen who does not make 
use of social benefits should be considered self-supporting, regardless of the 
level of his or her personal income or its source and hence the citizen can 
appeal to his or her right to settle in any given EU nation.36 
 
The case law of the ECJ projects a notion of citizenship that differs both from 
the breadwinner citizen, and from the self-supporting individual currently 
promoted through Dutch social security and integration policies. The emerging 
EU notion of citizenship is not shaped by a gendered hierarchy but does include 
family life and care labour as constitutive elements. It acknowledges the need 
for states to protect themselves from excessive demands on their financial 
resources, but does not link human labour to a family (or even a survival) wage. 
Rather, the price of labour is linked to an individual’s productive capacity; not 
to reproductive needs. The EU Court of Justice, champion of free market 
liberalism, seems to focus on individual labour as an expression of productive 
endeavour rather than as a source of (family) income. 
 
This approach has important implications for Dutch family migration policies. As 
discussed above, the breadwinner citizen still plays a significant, if ambiguous, 
role in those policies. On the one hand, the contours of the Dutch nation are 
now being defined in opposition to patriarchal hierarchies shaped in the 
breadwinner citizen’s image. On the other hand, the breadwinner citizen still 
serves as a model of civic virtue, belying the fact that the family wage and the 
full-time permanent job seem to be on their way to becoming things of the 
past.  
 
Conclusion 
 
It remains to be seen where exactly the ECJ’s perspective on the nature of 
citizenship is now bringing us. Is it focussed on establishing a supra-national 
regime meant to endow EU citizens with specific claims to human rights, or is it 
after all primarily aimed at creating a ‘level playing field’ to facilitate an 
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increasingly mobile and flexible economic order?37 If the case law of the ECJ has 
implications for how the borders of the EU are to be drawn, it will have 
implications for human relations within those borders as well. At first glance it 
does seem to offer new opportunities to validate, without cultural prejudice, 
family relations and the care work these imply. But it also suggests a 
reconfiguration between (European) state and family in controlling 
reproductive labour,38 and between (European) state and market in controlling 
productive labour.39 Whatever else it implies, it seems to spell the end of the 
male breadwinner citizen, and the associated ideal of the full-time permanent 
family wage earning employee, as model citizen and chief addressee of the 
national welfare state.  
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